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Background: Why is enforcement important?
背景：执法之重要性
• Enforcement vital to strong securities markets (La Porta, 2006)
• 有效执法及追诉对健全之证券市场具有相当的重要性
• Both Hong Kong and Singapore have significantly strengthened 
private enforcement framework since Asian financial crisis:
• 香港及新加坡自亚洲金融危机之后，具体强化对证券法之私人执行的
机制，例如：
– HK: statutory derivative action (2004)
– 香港于2004年强化公司法下之衍生诉讼机制
– Singapore: statutory compensation scheme for violation of 






• How robust is private and public enforcement of corporate 
and securities laws in Hong Kong and Singapore
• 于香港及新加坡，就公司及证券法令，利用私人执行或公部门
执行之有效性




Our focus   焦点领域
• Breaches of directors’ duties
• 违反董事责任与忠实义务




Public and private enforcement: nomenclature 
and hybrids （定义及形态）
• Public enforcement （公部门执行）
– Government actors eg securities regulators, public 
prosecutors and private organisation with quasi-public 




– Shareholder actions, derivative actions
– 例如股东提起之诉讼、代表（或派生）诉讼
• Hybrids （公私混合）
– e.g. government actors obtain compensation for 




The choice of jurisdictions市场选择
• We choose Hong Kong and Singapore to compare for the 
following reasons:
– Both are Asian financial centres
– Similar adoption of Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance 
– Both have concentrated shareholdings among their publicly 
listed companies








Theoretical framework of enforcement 
理论架构
• Limitations of measuring “inputs” (budgets, resource 
allocations) due to availability of data
• 鉴于有限的信息，难以有效分析对法令执行的「输入」因素
（例如政府预算、资源分配等等）






Theoretical framework of enforcement
理论架构
• Merits of enforcement by regulators
– E.g. Australia (ASIC), UK (FCA), US (SEC)
– Range of sanctions can be calibrated
– Directorial disqualification possible 
– Wide ranging powers of investigation required in cross-
border fraud









Theoretical framework of enforcement
理论架构
• Merits of private enforcement
– Compensation and Deterrence of wrongdoing
– However, collective action problem and civil procedure rules 





• Enforcing continuous disclosure and directorial duties
– Differences in choices of beneficiaries of compensation 
































2 2.53% 2 5.56%
Total number of
actions 总计
79 100% 36 100%
SMU Classification: Restricted






































Section 214 2017 84,880,000 HKD
港币












Section 214 2010 Ordered company to bring
civil proceedings
命令公司提起民事诉讼




Section 214 2017 Execute deed of guarantee
提供保证






• HK: section 213 and/or 214 of the SFO
• 于香港，可能系违反证券曁期条例第213或214条
• Singapore: indirect compensation through the use of freezing 




• Freezing orders critical
– China Sky (2013), China Aviation Oil (2005)
• 法院之冻结命令于实务上相当重要
– 例如，China Sky (2013), China Aviation Oil (2005)
SMU Classification: Restricted
Intensity of public enforcement
公部门执行的强度





























PP Reg Exch PP/Reg Reg/Exch Other
Hong Kong Singapore
SMU Classification: Restricted
Intensity of public enforcement
公部门执行的强度
































PP Reg Exch PP/Reg Reg/Exch Other
Hong Kong Singapore
SMU Classification: Restricted












Prosecution only 仅有检察官 0 0 0
SFC only 仅有证券主管机关 1 9 3
SEHK only 仅有证券交易所 3 18 0
Prosecution and SFC 检察官及主
管机闯
0 0 0
SFC and SEHK主管机关及证交所 0 0 0










Prosecution only 仅有检察官 0 0 5
MAS only 仅有证券主管机关 1 0 0
SGX only 仅有证券交易所 3 1 0
SGX and MAS 证券主管机关及交
易所
1 0 1
Other其他 0 0 1
Total 总计 5 1 7
SMU Classification: Restricted
Sanctions imposed 裁罚之种类
Type of sanctions 种类 Hong Kong 香港 Singapore 新加坡
Reprimand and/or governance changes 命
令公司管理及治理变动
35 19
Custodial sentence 有期徒刑 4 3
Criminal fine 形事罚金 5 5
Custodial and criminal fine徒刑加罚金 0 1
Disqualification+ 董事失格 14 2
Winding up of company 公司解散 1 0









Cases where the action was unsuccessful
or where convictions were imposed but
quashed subsequently 最终执行失败之案件
1 1
Total 总计 73 32
16
Table 4: Number and Type of Sanctions Imposed for All Cases
表四：所有案例之裁罚手段之数量
SMU Classification: Restricted





























0 0 1 3 4
SFC only 仅有证券
主管机关









1 0 0 0
1
SFC and SEHK 主
管机关及证交所




Table 5: Length of time to resolution for concluded cases (public enforcement) – all cases
Panel A: Hong Kong
表五：香港 –案件执行至结案之时间（所有公部门执行之案件）
SMU Classification: Restricted










































2 0 0 0
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Panel B: Singapore 新加坡
SMU Classification: Restricted




















2008 1 0 3 3
2009 0 0 6 1
2010 2 0 2 0
2011 2 1 4 2
2012 3 2 2 0
2013 4 2 3 1
2014 5 0 1 0
2015 16 4 4 2
总计 33 9 25 9
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SMU Classification: Restricted
Lessons and Implications 规范反思
• Private enforcement is rare
• 于香港及新加坡，私人执行相当少见
• Directorial duties enforcement rare in Singapore, despite the 





Lessons and implications 规范反思
• Individual and/or corporate liability (for corporate disclosure violation)
– Should the proper beneficiaries of compensation be the company 
(as in China Sky) or the shareholders (as in the case of 
Greencool)
– Should the proper defendant relating to the compensation be the 
company or the individual directors?
– Should the same approach be taken in relation to criminal and civil 










• Gaps between law in books and law in action
– Enforcement of directors’ duties (in Singapore) 
• 法令规定以及法律具体执行的成果间，有相当的落差
– 例如新加坡有关董事忠实义务之执行
• Differences in which corporate disclosure is enforced privately 
(beneficiaries of compensation and defendants) and 
recommendations for reform
• 有关公司披露规定的违反，立法建议以及事实上违反公司披露
规定系主要透过私人执行的方式（即向特定被告请求损害赔偿）
来执法之间，存在有相当落差
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